Before troops took Kailash heights, Army appeared East to alleviate Ladakh stress

Before Indian troops occupied strategic heights within the Kailash vary in jap Ladakh in August final yr to show the tables on the Chinese, one of many choices thought-about by the Army brass was a build-up, and a counter-thrust if want be, within the Eastern Sector to “relieve pressure in the area of Ladakh”.
The Kailash vary operation, which put the Chinese at an obstacle for the primary time for the reason that begin of the standoff alongside the Line of Actual Control in May final yr, led to the disengagement of troops and armoured columns on the north and south banks of Pangong Tso and the Kailash vary this February.
A prime supply, who was concerned in army decision-making, instructed The Indian Express: “We were trying to keep this entire conflict situation localised to the Ladakh sector. It was not in our interest to escalate it and take it to other sectors also. Because we had to see what our capabilities are, what the connectivity issues are, what force levels are available. That was our thinking.”
Yet “we wanted to be ready in other sectors also, so that we are able to dissuade them”. For this, within the Middle Sector “where we were weak, we pushed in more troops,” the supply stated. The Sino-Indian boundary has three sectors – Western (Ladakh), Middle and Eastern.
According to the supply, the Eastern Command was instructed “you take measures first to augment your defensive capability, and then be ready to go launch (an offensive) to relieve pressure in the area of Ladakh”.
“Our intention was to keep it localised to Ladakh.” Within jap Ladakh, the supply stated, the Chumar space was additionally thought-about a chance, however there had been transgressions there earlier and “we did not want to go to an area where we had been at a disadvantage”.
Plans on tips on how to counter the Chinese started to be mentioned quickly after the beginning of the standoff. “Our basic philosophy of dealing with Chinese incursions is that you contain that incursion, wherever they come in. You block whatever directions they can expand. And then be ready to do what we call a QPQ (quid pro quo) Operation,” the supply stated.
Such an operation, the supply stated, might be nearer to the place the Chinese have are available, or it may be in a distinct space, nevertheless it needs to be “tactically viable, which you can hold on to, sustain”.
Keeping this in thoughts, further forces have been introduced in. Their induction took time since they needed to be acclimatised.
“It was happening since the beginning,” a lot earlier than the violent conflict in Galwan Valley on June 15 during which 20 Indian troops misplaced their lives whereas China admitted, belatedly, to lack of 4 PLA personnel.
“Because they (Chinese) had come in at multiple locations,” the supply stated, there was fixed dialogue between Army Headquarters and the Northern Command.
The Army HQ, the supply stated, was given displays on doable areas, however “the decision is at the command and lower level” as soon as there’s a go-ahead from the highest since “we cannot dictate, sitting in Delhi, which position will be more advantageous… some build-up was also being seen across the Kailash range”.
The Army’s deployment within the area was reorganised “for better command and control… basically, with the aim that you have separate forces to undertake this offensive operation”.
The QPQ, the supply stated, may have occurred “much before” August, however received delayed.
The Kailash vary positions allowed India to dominate not solely the strategic Spanggur Gap, which can be utilized to launch an offensive because the Chinese had performed in 1962, but additionally the PLA’s Moldo Garrison.
“Tactically, it was disadvantageous to them. Then they got serious,” the supply stated.

During this repositioning, warning photographs have been fired for the primary time between India and China. “Although they were only warning shots, both small arms as well as rocket launchers were fired. They were totally taken aback,” the supply stated.
General Zhao Zongqi, PLA’s Western Theatre Commander at the moment, had “started something which did not pan out the way they had visualised or planned” and “there was no possible or favourable exit strategy” for him, the supply stated.

But a brand new commander, General Zhang Xudong, changed Zhao in December, and occasions moved in the direction of discussions. The new commander, the supply stated, “actually indicated that they want to move ahead”. Following talks in January, India and China moved in February to disengage in Pangong Tso and the Kailash vary.
On the doable lack of leverage by giving up Kailash vary positions, the supply stated “these are tactical considerations that cannot dictate your strategy… Overall, the politico-military interface is very important in this, what do you want to achieve. Are you going to continue staying there, eyeball-to-eyeball? Are you going to move up now, all along the border and mobilise?… What we did in eastern Ladakh, we could not have replicated that all along”.