Written by Julian E. Barnes and Eric Schmitt
Intelligence officers made a vital discovery this spring after monitoring Ayman al-Zawahri, the chief of al-Qaida, to Kabul, Afghanistan: He favored to learn alone on the balcony of his protected home early within the morning.
Analysts seek for that type of pattern-of-life intelligence, any behavior the CIA can exploit. In al-Zawahri’s case, his lengthy balcony visits gave the company a possibility for a transparent missile shot that might keep away from collateral harm.
The hunt for al-Zawahri, one of many world’s most needed terrorists, stretches again to earlier than the 9/11 assaults. The CIA continued to seek for him as he rose to the highest of al-Qaida after the loss of life of Osama bin Laden and after the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan final yr. And a misstep in the course of the chase, the recruitment of a double agent, led to one of many bloodiest days within the company’s historical past.
Soon after the United States left Kabul, the CIA sharpened its efforts to search out al-Zawahri, satisfied he would attempt to return to Afghanistan. Senior officers had informed the White House they’d be capable to keep and construct informant networks contained in the nation from afar and that the United States wouldn’t be blind to terrorism threats there. For the company, discovering al-Zawahri could be a key check of that assertion.
This article relies on interviews with present and former American and different officers, impartial analysts who’ve studied the decadeslong hunt and others briefed on the occasions main as much as the weekend strike. Most spoke on the situation of anonymity due to the delicate intelligence used to search out al-Zawahri.
For years, al-Zawahri was considered hiding within the border space of Pakistan, the place many Qaida and Taliban leaders took refuge after the US invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001. He was needed in reference to the 1998 embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya, and the CIA had tracked a community of people that intelligence officers thought supported him.
The examination of that community intensified with the US’ exit from Afghanistan final yr and a perception amongst some intelligence officers that senior leaders of al-Qaida could be tempted to return.
The hunch proved proper. The company came upon that al-Zawahri’s household had returned to a protected home in Kabul. Although the household tried to make sure they weren’t being watched and to maintain al-Zawahri’s location secret, intelligence businesses quickly realized he too had returned to Afghanistan.
“There was a renewed effort to figure out where he was,” stated Mick Mulroy, a former CIA officer. “The one good thing that might have come out of withdrawing from Afghanistan is that certain high-level terrorist figures would then think it is safe for them to be there.”
The protected home was owned by an aide to senior officers within the Haqqani community, a battle-hardened and violent wing of the Taliban authorities, and it was in an space managed by the group. Senior Taliban leaders often met on the home, however American officers have no idea what number of knew that the Haqqanis have been hiding al-Zawahri.
If some senior Taliban officers didn’t know that the Haqqanis had allowed al-Zawahri to return, his killing may drive a wedge between the teams, impartial analysts and others briefed on the occasions stated.
It isn’t clear why Al-Zawahri moved again to Afghanistan. He had lengthy made recruiting and promotional movies, and it might have been simpler to supply them in Kabul. He additionally might have had higher entry to medical remedy.
No matter what the explanation, his ties to leaders of the Haqqani community led US intelligence officers to the protected home.
“The Haqqanis have a very long relationship with al-Qaida going back to the mujahedeen days,” stated Dan Hoffman, a former CIA officer. “They provide al-Qaida with a lot of tactical support that they need.”
Once the protected home was positioned, the CIA adopted the playbook it wrote in the course of the hunt for bin Laden. The company constructed a mannequin of the location and sought to be taught all the things about it.
Analysts finally recognized a determine who lingered on the balcony studying, however by no means left the home, as al-Zawahri.
US officers shortly determined to focus on him, however the location of the home posed issues. It was within the Sherpur neighborhood of Kabul, an city space of carefully spaced homes. A missile armed with a big explosive may harm close by houses. And any form of incursion by Special Operations forces could be prohibitively harmful, limiting the choices for the US authorities to conduct a strike.
The seek for al-Zawahri carried enormous significance for the company. After the US invasion of Afghanistan, the CIA base in Khost province turned residence to a focusing on group devoted to monitoring each bin Laden and al-Zawahri. It was one of many leads developed by the CIA to trace al-Zawahri that proved disastrous for the company’s officers at that base, Camp Chapman.
CIA officers hoped Humam Khalil Abu Mulal al-Balawi, a Jordanian physician and propagandist for al-Qaida, would make them al-Zawahri. He supplied American officers with details about al-Zawahri’s well being, convincing them his intelligence was actual. But he was in reality a double agent, and on Dec. 30, 2009, he confirmed up at Camp Chapman with a suicide vest. When it exploded, seven CIA officers have been killed.
For many, the Khost assault intensified efforts to search out al-Zawahri. “To honor their legacy, you carry on with the mission,” Hoffman stated.
In 2012 and 2013, the CIA targeted the hunt on Pakistan’s North Waziristan area. CIA analysts have been assured they’d discovered the small village the place al-Zawahri was hiding. But intelligence businesses couldn’t discover his home within the city of a few dozen compounds, making a raid or drone strike unimaginable.
Still, the U.S. hunt pressured al-Zawahri to stay within the tribal areas of Pakistan, probably limiting the effectiveness of his management inside al-Qaida.
“Anytime anything related to bin Laden or Zawahri hit the intel channels, everyone stopped to pitch in and help,” stated Lisa Maddox, a former CIA analyst. “It was the CIA’s promise to the public: to bring them to justice.”
On April 1, high intelligence officers briefed nationwide safety officers on the White House concerning the protected home and the way they’d tracked al-Zawahri. After the assembly, the CIA and different intelligence businesses labored to be taught extra about what they known as al-Zawahri’s sample of life.
One key perception was that he was by no means seen leaving the home and solely appeared to get contemporary air by standing on a balcony on an higher flooring. He remained on the balcony for prolonged intervals, which gave the CIA likelihood to focus on him.
Al-Zawahri continued to work on the protected home, producing movies to be distributed to the Qaida community.
A senior administration official, who spoke on the situation of anonymity to debate the delicate choices resulting in the strike, stated the intelligence introduced to the White House had been repeatedly vetted, together with by a crew of impartial analysts tasked with figuring out everybody who was staying on the protected home.
As choices for a strike have been developed, intelligence officers examined what sort of missile might be fired at al-Zawahri with out inflicting main harm to the protected home or the neighborhood round it. They finally selected a type of Hellfire missile designed to kill a single particular person.
William Burns, the CIA director, and different intelligence officers briefed President Joe Biden on July 1, this time with the mannequin of the protected home, the senior official stated.
At that assembly, Biden requested about the opportunity of collateral harm, prodding Burns to take him by the steps of how officers had discovered al-Zawahri and confirmed his data, and their plans to kill him.
Biden ordered a collection of analyses. The White House requested the National Counterterrorism Center to supply an impartial evaluation on the impression of al-Zawahri’s removing, each in Afghanistan and to the community worldwide, stated a senior intelligence official. The president additionally requested concerning the potential dangers to Mark R. Frerichs, an American hostage held by the Haqqanis.
In June and July, officers met a number of instances within the Situation Room to debate the intelligence and study the potential ramifications.
The CIA plans known as for it to make use of its personal drones. Because it was utilizing its personal belongings, few Pentagon officers have been introduced into the planning for the strike, and plenty of senior navy officers realized about it solely shortly earlier than the White House announcement, an official stated.
On July 25, Biden, glad with the plan, approved the CIA to conduct the airstrike when the chance introduced itself. Sunday morning in Kabul, it did. A drone flown by the CIA discovered al-Zawahri on his balcony. The company operatives fired two missiles, ending a greater than two-decadelong hunt.
This article initially appeared in The New York Times.