The global nuclear landscape is shifting, sparking intense discussion in India about the potential necessity of conducting nuclear tests, including thermonuclear ones. This comes amid speculation surrounding renewed US nuclear testing interest, alleged Russian drone tests, and Pakistani nuclear experiments.
India’s established nuclear policy, since the 1998 Pokhran-II tests, has been based on ‘credible minimum deterrence’ and a no-first-use (NFU) pledge. This self-imposed restraint has been key to its international standing. However, the current geopolitical climate is prompting some strategic voices to question if India can afford to maintain this moratorium.
Data indicates India holds around 180 warheads, while China is expected to possess 1,000 by 2030, and Pakistan’s arsenal could reach 200 by 2028. The strategic threat is amplified by China’s deployment of MIRV-capable ICBMs like the DF-41, designed to strike multiple targets.
There’s a compelling argument that if other major nuclear powers abandon restraint, India must adapt to maintain its deterrence. Proponents of testing suggest it’s an opportunity for India to unequivocally validate its thermonuclear weapons technology, enhance warhead miniaturization for advanced missile systems, and bolster its long-term security posture. While diplomatic repercussions are a concern, the evolving strategic environment might compel New Delhi to consider demonstrating its full nuclear capabilities.
